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Abstract
The manner in which governments charge mineral resource produc-
ers has been the subject of considerable debate. In particular, there
is a continuing debate about whether royalties should be reduced or
eliminated, the preferred alternative then being some variant of an
income-based charge such as a resource rent tax, a policy adopted in
Norway, the United Kingdom and Australia. The argument for avoid-
ing royalties is based on analyses demonstrating that royalties and
other quantity-based charges distort production decisions and lead to
outcomes such as high-grading and premature mine closure. We argue
that it is inappropriate to infer that royalties are inefficient from the
perspective of the resource owner (typically a government on behalf of
society). Rather, the royalty serves a key pricing purpose and should
be interpreted as the capital loss on the resource owner’s balance sheet
from extracting marginal reserves. We demonstrate this result under
various conditions of uncertainty and informational asymmetry, us-
ing an incentive-based framework which enables us to highlight the
separation of asset ownership from asset use. The principal-agent
framework is consistent with the contracting problem encountered by
governments who as resource owners contract with private sector firms
for extraction rights.
JEL Classification: H21, H25, Q38
Keywords: Natural resource taxation; optimal mining royalty; asym-
metric information
1 Introduction
The theoretical and practical challenges of designing a fiscal regime for the
extraction of an exhaustible mineral resource have generated a substantial
economics literature and considerable debate amongst policy-makers, inde-
pendent advisers, and resource producers.1 The choice of instruments and
their role in a fiscal regime is influenced potentially by many considerations
whose relative importance varies with the particular circumstances of the
resource and the jurisdiction in which it is located.2 A common feature of
the design problem, however, is the desire to achieve an acceptable return
for the resource owner - most often a government on behalf of the public -
in an economically efficient manner. In this regard, it is frequently argued
that the optimal device is a profit-sharing arrangement, and that quantity-
based royalties (ad rem or ad valorem) should be avoided because they distort
incentives and create inefficiencies.
It is important not to lose sight of the fact that efficiency and optimality
are relative to the objective specified. In the analyses that have led to the
conclusion that royalties distort incentives, the typical goal is maximization
of the expected net present value (profit) obtained from extraction, gener-
ally from the perspective of a single resource producer.3 No weight is given
to the impact of extraction on other measures of material concern to the
owner, whether society or private individual; implicitly, at least, the oppor-
tunity cost of extraction is zero. These analyses have been mainly concerned
with intertemporal extraction profiles (the timing and quantity of resource
extracted) when reserve extraction is less than complete (see, for example,
Conrad and Hool 1985; Otto et al. 2006) but have also addressed risk-sharing
when the value of a mining tract is uncertain (Leland 1978). The introduc-
tion of a royalty alters the firm’s efficiency (profit-maximizing) conditions
and creates a tendency for the firm to extract the resource more rapidly and
to shut down mining operations earlier, leaving otherwise valuable reserves in
the ground. In this context, pure profit-sharing provides a non-distortionary
means of sharing risk and preserving production efficiency.
1Recent reviews can be found in Boadway and Keen 2010; Otto et al. 2006; and Hogan
and Goldsworthy 2010.
2Boadway and Keen 2010 provide a comprehensive analysis.
3A typical example is Garnaut and Clunies Ross (1983) where the objective function
is simply maximization of the present value from extraction either from the perspective of
the producer or without regard to ownership.
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These conclusions have led naturally to the advocacy of profit-sharing
schemes, among which resource rent taxes in particular have enjoyed some in-
creased popularity, and a movement away from royalties in resource contracts.
Advice by major international financial institutions also has placed empha-
sis on ”rent” charges, while accepting the need for modest royalties despite
their claimed disadvantages (IMF 2012, Otto et al. 2006, and Baunsgaard
2012). In addition, as noted by the IMF (IMF 2012, Box 3), high-income
countries, with the notable exception of the United States, have moved away
from royalties and replaced them with income-based charges. In contrast to
this trend, there are recent examples of countries (including Mongolia and
Zambia) where royalty rates have been increased.4
The debate about the merits of royalties relative to profits charges is
empirically important because countries vary with respect to application.
The differences result in part from the economic framework used to evaluate
the policies and, as we have noted, the view that royalties are economically
inefficient. These differences are seen in Table 1 where relevant provisions for
the issue at hand are summarized for some petroleum-producing countries.
We note that all countries impose a standard profits tax which is generally
applicable, perhaps at different rates, to all economic sectors. In our analysis
of the roles of royalties (production-based charges) and income-based charges,
we take as given the generally applicable profits tax regime.5
The contrast is most starkly illustrated by comparing the United States
(federal offshore) and Canada (Alberta) with the United Kingdom, Australia
and Norway.6 The United States and Canada (Alberta) employ production
charges as a basis for computing the factor payment while countries in the
latter group have eliminated production-based royalties and substituted
4Mongolia introduced a surtax royalty with rates that vary by mineral in 2011 (Ernst
and Young 2012). In 2013 Mongolia also increased the royalty on gold (http://www.in-
fomongolia.com/ct/ci/7348). Zambia has increased the base royalty on copper to 6%
(Conrad 2014).
5We note also that contractual form does not in itself have economic relevance for
the outcome. For instance, a production sharing contract in its pure form is effectively
a resource rent tax (profits-based charge) with a zero interest rate applied to the cash
flow and is equivalent to such a charge imposed in a more traditional lease contract. See
Alexeev and Conrad (2014).
6The United Kingdom, Australia and Norway all used royalties when production was
just starting, returns were high, fields were large, and costs were relatively low. They have
moved to profits-based charges for only marginal fields or, perhaps, marginal production
where royalties were paid for many years and now costs are high.
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resource rent taxes or excess profits charges literally in lieu of royalties. The
Australian system is the most clearly aligned with the Garnaut Clunies Ross
framework (see the Policy Transition Group (2010) study and the Report
to the Treasurer (2009) on Australian tax reform) but it is clear that the
United Kingdom, Indonesia and Norway have replaced royalties with a type
of profits-based charge in addition to the standard profits tax. These charges
are limited exclusively to natural resource production and thus are further
evidence of the natural resource basis of the charge.
The United States, on the other hand, has a standard flat rate ad valorem
charge which corresponds to the historical and current treatment of factor
payments in private ownership economies. In particular, private owners of
reserves in the United States use royalties as do oil companies who retain
an interest in operations where production is contracted to others. Such
royalties paid to those who retain an interest are called overriding royalties.
Property rights to reserves are vested in the Canadian provisions. Alberta’s
royalties, which are per unit and have rates which vary with both price and
quantity, are evidence of property ownership whereas the central government
in Canada imposes no such charge, because the mineral rights are held by
the Canadian provinces.
Other countries employ a combination of royalties and excess profits taxes
(production sharing). Some countries use a sliding scale for royalties based
on geological characteristics (e.g., the Netherlands, Kazakhstan, and Nigeria)
while others are flat rate (e.g., Azerbaijan). China’s excess profits tax is really
a production-based charge and thus should technically be regarded as similar
to the one employed in Alberta.
The profits-based charge might be variable, based on either rates of return
(e.g., Ghana) or net present value. In addition, a carried interest such as the
one used in Ghana might be a type of profits charge depending on the interest
rate used to compute the carry.
Finally, the Iraqi system is based on a service contract arrangement. Un-
der this regime, no royalty is charged because the producer is simply sup-
plying a service and the government retains the rights to all production and
sales. Thus, the efficiency issue in this case, as will be shown, is whether the
government determines the extraction profile (implicitly using the shadow
price to determine the extraction profile via internal prices). The contractor
is then paid a service fee (like a law firm) in exchange for the services pro-
vided. Such a fee, however, has risk sharing characteristics in that the fee is
based on the overall profitability of the property.
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Given the variation in practice despite the widespread condemnation of
royalties, it is important to revisit the question of efficient payment schemes.
The practice of applying royalties might be more in accord with efficiency
than either the advice to the contrary or the theory upon which that advice
is based. In particular, we will demonstrate that there is an essential role for
royalties in mineral extraction contracts. This conclusion is not inconsistent
with the body of analysis referred to above but follows from taking a different
perspective on what is the appropriate problem to be solved, departing from
the previous literature in two significant, related respects. First, we account
for the fact that the opportunity cost of extracting reserves will typically not
be zero even in the absence of physical exhaustion of the resource during the
extraction period. Second, we view the determination of optimal mineral
resource payments not as a taxation problem but as a contracting problem;
specifically, a principal-agent problem where property rights are clearly de-
fined and the objectives of the resource owner (typically the government) and
the extracting firm are not generally aligned.7
We argue that there are fundamental reasons to view the determination of
the optimal resource payment structure from a perspective that differs from
the maximization of economic rent from extraction assuming the opportunity
cost of extraction is zero. In other words, the discrediting of royalties has
been based on analyses of the wrong formulation of the problem. When the
government’s objective is no longer congruent with the extracting firm’s goal
of private profit-maximization, it will in general be necessary to align the
firm’s incentive in order to achieve social efficiency. It should be emphasized
that while we are framing this problem in terms of government as the owner
of the resource (the principal), the fundamental issue is accounting properly
for opportunity cost. Assuming private ownership would alter neither the
nature of the argument nor its implications.
The principal-agent structure is a natural one in the present context be-
cause of the separation of ownership of reserves from the extraction decision,
as well as the uncertainty, informational asymmetry, and limited observ-
7The reason that firms contract with governments for extraction rights is the simple
fact that the government holds the mineral rights. Otherwise, the contracting problem
would be between private agents as is the case in the United States where mineral rights
can be vested in private hands. It is important to note that the use of the principal-agent
framework is not necessary to demonstrate the efficiency of the royalty. We show below
that the royalty is the price that would otherwise be reflected in a market for reserves or
as the opportunity cost of a productive factor in the case of efficient state ownership.
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ability that characterize mineral exploitation and need to be considered in
optimal contract design. We begin by abstracting for the most part from
these important features, in order to demonstrate that the argument for us-
ing royalties does not depend on the complexities arising from uncertainty
and information issues. We show that even in conditions of certainty and
complete information, it will generally be optimal to have a per unit charge
imposed on extraction. Further, this royalty can (and should) be interpreted
as the payment for a scarce factor of production - the price of reserves that
will equilibrate supply and demand for the extractable resource and maxi-
mize the surplus available to be distributed to both parties to the contract.
In this regard, the mineral reserves are no different from any productive in-
put such as labor, and a royalty as the price of reserves is no different than
a wage rate as the price of labor.
We then proceed to show that the presence of uncertainty, though compli-
cating the analysis, does not fundamentally alter the nature of the problem.
The form taken by the optimal royalty in this context is a natural general-
ization of the royalty in the case of certainty.
2 Context
There are a number of potential factors underpinning the formulation of the
resource owner’s problem proposed here. Broadly speaking, they relate to
three fundamental concepts: property rights, rent, and opportunity cost.
(i) Property rights. Governments should not be regarded - or regard them-
selves - simply as tax collectors in the mineral production process. As the
owner, on behalf of society, of the reserves of an exhaustible natural resource,
a government owns the stock of a factor of production (reserves) from which
a flow (extraction) is made possible. Reserves are an asset on the resource
owner’s (and society’s) balance sheet. When mineral assets are held by the
state, the value of reserves should be reflected on the state’s balance sheet
just like assets used to produce other publicly-provided goods and services
such as mail delivery, highway services, and even steel and electricity, de-
pending on the degree of state participation in the economy. The fact that
the mineral reserves are a gift of nature and were thus free to the government
does not alter this; nor does the fact that the mineral extracting firm may
have acquired the rights, for some period, to extract the resource. Title to the
stock of reserves is not transferred to the extracting firm when the reserves
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are held by the state.8 The government owns the initial stock of reserves and
it owns the remaining stock - plus any residual value of the land or sea - after
the lease expires. It is the quantity of the reserves being extracted that is
being sold from the resource owner’s inventory, as well as the lease rights to
use the property (surface rights and other real property) for a specified time
period.9
The fact that extraction rights may be granted for a long period, and po-
tentially be renewable, does not vitiate this point. If indeed this did amount
to a de facto transfer of property rights, the firm should then internalize the
shadow price of the reserves.10 If there were an actual transfer of property
rights, as permitted with private property in the United States, then the ex-
tracting firm would be able to dispose of the property and recover the value
of its surface or subsurface rights after the closure of the mine. In this case,
the opportunity cost would be fully taken into account as if a royalty had
been imposed.
(ii) Rent. Consequently, except in instances where private property rights
include mineral rights, it is the government that has claim to the resource
rent, defined here as the return to the scarce productive factor. The resource
rent will be capitalized into the price of the asset (the reserves and the land
or sea that contains the reserves) and be reflected as an asset value on the
government’s balance sheet. The value of the combined asset base will be the
maximum value of its use, which may or may not involve extracting reserves
in the present or at any time in the future.11
(iii) Opportunity cost. Society’s opportunity cost of using the resource
8In the United States, private property rights include the reserves. Consequently, any
person holding land may transfer all of the land rights, including the reserves, and maintain
no economic interest in the property. Alternatively, it is possible for owners to unbundle
the property rights by selling surface (and related) rights, while retaining the mineral
rights.
9The use value of the entire deposit will generally not be zero for the investor. The
use value, on a flow basis, includes extraction, pressure (in oil deposits), and the physical
structure of the deposit.
10If the resource producer internalizes the opportunity cost of reserves, then a royalty
charged by the resource owner can still be efficient. The royalty can then be perceived as a
transfer with no efficiency effects. For instance, a royalty that rises at the rate of interest
in the original Hotelling model would equate to such a transfer (see Hotelling 1931).
11The maximum present value of the property might be achieved by some means other
than extraction. For instance, the present value of an oil tract might be $10 billion dollars
but the value of the tract for real estate development might be $15 billion if the tract is
located in central Paris or midtown Manhattan.
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(having reserves extracted by a particular firm at a particular time in a spec-
ified amount) might be determined by any of the following alternatives: (i)
keeping the reserves in the ground; (ii) using the surface rights for some other
activity such as farming, housing, fishing, or other recreational or productive
pursuits; (iii) selling the reserves for the market price (lump sum) and not
retaining any economic interest in the residual value of the property12; (iv)
leasing the reserves to a different firm; or (v) carrying out the resource ex-
traction (renting the other factors of production) or entering into a service
agreement with a mineral producer to carry out the extraction.
Governments have other reasons for being concerned with the conse-
quences of extraction, including various economic and environmental effects
- externalities - such as dislocation of the local population, Dutch disease,
and environmental degradation. All of these are potentially significant but
will not be distinguished explicitly in the current analysis.
Alternatives (i) and (ii) have relevance at the margin because any ben-
efit from increasing extraction today is reduced by the cost of forgoing the
use of surface rights for some other economic activity or for extracting more
reserves later. This view of the resource owner’s position suggests an associ-
ated pricing issue for the reserves being extracted, related to the decline in
value of the asset base relative to the opportunity cost of alternative uses.
Prior to extraction, the resource stock has economic value and, if extraction
occurs, this economic value is diminished by use. Even after the cessation of
extraction and closure of a mine, any residual reserves or surface rights are
potentially valuable and may become economic for extraction, as has been
the case historically, either because of an increase in the value of the mineral
(as output) or with lower extraction costs as a result of the application of
new technologies (fracking being an obvious example). Some examples where
mines have closed and later reopened are given in Table 2. In many of these
cases, the mine closed because prices were too low relative to cost given the
quality of the deposit only to be reopened later when prices increased. Like-
wise, the land or sea in which the mineral is located is valuable and this value
may be reduced by extraction of the resource. It is the value of reserves and
the scarce resources that contain those reserves which define the total value
to any resource owner, government included.
12Selling part of the country is generally not an option for a government, in contrast to
private ownership.
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3 Profit-sharing, royalties and social efficiency:
the case of certainty and complete informa-
tion
In this section we begin the formal analysis by considering the benchmark sit-
uation in which there is no uncertainty and contracting parties have complete
information. We demonstrate in this context the proposition that a profit-
sharing arrangement will generally not be sufficient to insure that a social
optimum will be implemented, and that to achieve this objective a royalty
is required. The importance of the divergence between the incentives facing
resource owners and producers, and the implications for decentralizing the
socially efficient outcome will be made clear. The subsequent introduction of
uncertainty as well as incomplete and asymmetric information will generalise
the results but will not alter the basic conclusion or affect the validity of the
underlying principles.
In this contracting situation, the principal is a resource owner (referred
to now as the government) and the agent is a resource-extracting firm. The
government evaluates the contract according to the payment it receives from
the firm and its residual valuation of the property, including reserves, after
extraction. The firm seeks to maximize its profit net of the payment made
to the government. Extraction, if it occurs, takes place in a single period
following the contract agreement.
LetH(x) be the payment made by the firm to the government if a quantity
x is extracted. Let R be the initial stock of reserves and ϕ(R − x) the
government’s residual valuation which will depend on the remaining reserves,
R − x, both directly and also indirectly through the impact of extraction
on the quality of the surrounding property (land or sea). We assume that
ϕ′(·) > 0 and ϕ′′(·) < 0.
The government’s objective function (for a given level of extraction) is
the sum of resource revenues and the value of remaining reserves:
W (x,R;H,ϕ) = H(x) + ϕ(R− x) (1)
For convenience, throughout the paper we will often denote residual re-
serves (R− x) by ∆.
The firm extracts a quantity x (0 ≤ x ≤ R) which for simplicity will
denote both the quantity of reserves extracted and also the quantity of the
resource above ground (oil pumped from a well). The production cost C rises
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directly with this quantity and also indirectly through the loss of pressure,
or increasing depth in the case of minerals, captured in the term ∆:
C = C(x,∆), C ′x > 0, C
′
∆ < 0. (2)
where subscripts indicate partial derivatives and the dependence of C on
input prices has been suppressed. The cost function is assumed to be convex
in x and we will assume throughout the paper that C ′x → +∞ as x → R
(equivalently, C ′∆ → −∞ as ∆→ 0).
Suppose that the government uses the royalty ρ(x) expressed as the total
amount that the firm that extracted x owes to the government. Denote by
pi(R, x) = p x− C(x,∆)− ρ(x),
the profit after the royalty where p is the value of output (extracted ore or
raw oil). In addition to the royalty, the government uses the profit share
β(pi) which is defined as the total payment that the firm whose profit after
royalty is pi owes to the government. The firm maximizes its profit net of the
resource payment:
pi∗(R, x) = pi(R, x)− β(pi(R, x)), (3)
under the constraint that the profit is non-negative. We also introduce no-
tation
pipi(R, x) = p x− C(x,∆)
for the profit before payments to the government.
Provided that the government uses the royalty ρ(x) and the profit share
β(pi) for the firm’s contract, the total tax revenue H(x,R) = ρ(x) + β(pi).
The socially efficient outcome would be achieved if the government owned
and operated the firm, in which case its payment would be equal to the profit:
H(x,R) = px− C(x,∆). (4)
Maximizing social welfare would necessitate that
W ′x = H
′
x − ϕ′ = p− C ′x + C ′∆ − ϕ′ = 0 (5)
This first-order condition shows that the socially efficient level of extraction
x˜ must satisfy:
p− C ′x = −C ′∆ + ϕ′. (6)
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The terms on the right hand side of (??) show that in contrast to the usual
efficiency condition, it is necessary to take account of two stock effects at the
margin: (a) the effect of declining pressure on the cost of extraction; and (b)
the change in the residual value of the property.
On the other hand, if the quantity decision is made by the firm seeking
to maximize pi∗(·) given the payment schedule, then (since β(·) is monotone)
the necessary condition is
pi∗′x = p− C ′x + C ′∆ −H ′x = 0. (7)
This first-order condition shows that the firm’s optimal level of extraction x∗
must satisfy:
p− C ′x = −C ′∆ +H ′x. (8)
If the government allows the profit-maximizing firm to operate in a decen-
tralized fashion, subject only to the payment function H(x,R), the firm will
take account of the stock effect on the cost of extraction, but not - except
indirectly through the payment H - the residual stock value. This results
from the fact that the resource producer has no right to the residual value of
the property once extraction ceases or the contract expires.
Comparing (??) and (??), it is clear that:
x˜ = x∗ if and only if H ′x = ϕ
′ (9)
Thus, the firm will reproduce the government’s desired outcome if and only
if the marginal payment by the firm is always equal to the marginal value
of the stock of reserves. In other words, the marginal payment by the firm
should equal the shadow price of reserves.
We can therefore state:
Theorem 1 Suppose that x˜ is the socially efficient extraction level and x∗ is
the firm’s profit-maximizing extraction level when both the government and
the extracting firm can observe or predict accurately the market price and the
level of reserves. Then x˜ = x∗ if and only if the marginal payment by the
firm is equal to the marginal value of residual reserves; i.e., H ′x = ϕ
′.
From Theorem ?? it follows that optimal marginal payment H ′x will be
zero if and only if marginal extraction has no effect on the stock value. This
is the first example of a recurrent theme: the argument for having a royalty
as part of the optimal payment scheme is tied to the marginal social cost of
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extraction. Unless this marginal social cost is zero, a payment is required on
a per unit basis. We return later to a consideration of the factors that will
determine this outcome.
The preceding analysis was focused on the incentives necessary for the
firm to behave according to the government’s preferences. In principle, if
the government has full information and there is no uncertainty, then it
can determine its optimal extraction profile, enforce it, and capture any
surplus as a lump-sum payment. The enforcement could be achieved in
a decentralized manner using a delta function that imposes an arbitrarily
high payment for anything other than the desired quantity level. However,
governments rarely if ever dictate extraction profiles and do not use lump-sum
systems exclusively. Instead, governments rely on price signals to indicate
the marginal value of lost reserves via the use of royalties.
Suppose now that the payment by the firm had been specified as a pure
profit share; i.e., if
H(x,R) = β(p x− C(x,∆)) (10)
and therefore pi = pipi.
The necessary condition for the firm’s optimization would then be (1 −
β′(pi(x,R))) pi′x = 0 which implies:
p− C ′x = −C ′∆ (11)
Comparing (??) and (??), the firm’s optimal choice under the profit-sharing
arrangement will reproduce the socially efficient quantity of extraction if and
only if ϕ′ ≡ 0; i.e., if and only if, at the margin, residual reserves have no
value, imputed or otherwise. The latter condition means that the value of
reserves for the entire future is zero because the residual value of the asset
is independent of the amount extracted. In other words, a profit share will
not be optimal, at least not by itself, if the mine has some residual value at
the margin so that, economically speaking, reserves are not in excess supply
forever.
Linear payment schemes
Resource-specific payments made by extracting firms are frequently based on
a combination of a fixed ad valorem royalty rate and a fixed profit share (per-
haps the generally applicable profits tax), with royalty payments deductible
from pre-tax profits (see Table 1). We can extend the previous analysis by
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examining the principal-agent problem when the payment functionH is spec-
ified to be of this type but restricted to being linear in the firm’s revenue
and its profit net of the royalty payment. With the form of the payment
function thus specified and the firm responding with its choice of extraction
level, the government will want to choose the parameters optimally, subject
to a participation constraint that leaves the firm with a non-negative payoff.
Again, by assumption, there is no uncertainty or informational problem to
address.
When the payment scheme is linear as specified above, then
H = ρpx+ β [(1− ρ)px− C(x,∆)] +K, (12)
where here β is the fractional share of profit (or a ‘Brown tax’), ρ is the
royalty rate, and K is a lump-sum payment.
It is straightforward to show that in this case the optimal royalty rate
is the marginal social value of reserves. In other words, it is this royalty
rate that provides the requisite incentive for the firm to behave in a socially
efficient manner.
Theorem 2 Suppose that x˜ is the socially efficient extraction level and x∗ is
the firm’s profit-maximizing extraction level when both the government and
the extracting firm can observe or predict accurately the market price and the
level of reserves. If the payment scheme is restricted to be a linear combi-
nation of an ad valorem royalty and a fixed profit share, then the extraction
level will be socially efficient (x˜ = x∗) if and only if the royalty rate is
ρ = ϕ′(R− x˜)/p. (13)
Proof:
The firm’s objective function is:
pi∗ = (1− β) [(1− ρ)px− C(x,∆)]−K (14)
and the government’s social welfare function is
W (x,R;H,ϕ) = ρpx+ β [(1− ρ)px− C(x,∆)] +K + ϕ(∆). (15)
Faced with the linear payment function, the firm will choose x∗ to maximize
pi∗. Provided the firm extracts a positive amount of the resource, x∗ will
satisfy the first-order condition:
pi∗′x = (1− β) [(1− ρ)p− C ′x + C ′∆] = 0 (16)
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i.e., x∗ satisfies
(1− ρ)p− C ′x = −C ′∆. (17)
Of the three payment parameters, only the royalty rate ρ affects the firm’s
decision at the margin. The quantity extracted x∗ will depend only on ρ:
x∗ = x∗(ρ).
Knowing how the firm will respond to the payment parameters, the gov-
ernment wants to choose these parameters in order to maximize W subject
to the participation constraint,
pi∗ = pipi −H(x,R) ≥ p¯i (18)
where p¯i represents the firm’s best profit alternative.
The participation constraint will be binding at the optimum and therefore
the social welfare subject to the firm’s first-order condition can be expressed
as:
W (H,ϕ) = pipi− p¯i+ϕ(R−x∗) = p x∗−C(x∗, R−x∗)− p¯i+ϕ(R−x∗) (19)
where x∗ is a function of ρ. From the first-order condition it follows that the
government will want the firm to choose its extraction quantity x∗ = x˜ such
that
p− C ′x(x∗, R− x∗) = −C ′∆(x∗, R− x∗) + ϕ′(R− x∗), (20)
where we used a simple fact that x∗ is a monotone function of ρ. Note that
condition (??) is the counterpart of condition (??) for the social optimum.
Comparing equations (??) and (??), the government will maximize social
welfare by choosing the royalty rate ρ such that ρp = ϕ′(R− x∗); i.e.,
ρ =
ϕ′(R− x∗)
p
. (21)
Q.E.D.
Theorem ?? establishes that in the optimal linear payment scheme, the
royalty rate will be set equal to the marginal social value of reserves. It
follows trivially that the optimal royalty will be zero if ϕ′ = 0; that is, if
there is no social consequence (or opportunity cost) to extraction other than
the resulting revenue.
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So the value of ϕ, and more particularly its derivative ϕ′, is of the essence
in concluding whether or not there is a material justification for including
royalties among the set of payment parameters.
As discussed above in Section ??, there are a number of factors contribut-
ing to the marginal social cost of extracting the resource. Most fundamen-
tally, marginal social cost will include a measure of the reduction in the value
of the asset (the stock of the resource) arising from its depletion. This is the
user cost of capital (Scott 1967) with resource depletion as the counterpart of
capital depreciation (Hall and Jorgenson 1967). Capital depreciation in the
Hall-Jorgenson model is exogenous whereas depreciation (depletion) in nat-
ural resource models is endogenous; the resource owner (not the producer)
must determine the rate at which the value of reserves is depleted. This is
analogous to a leasing company determining the charge (including deprecia-
tion) to impose for use of the leasing company’s machinery or to a distributor
determining the charge per unit of selling from inventory.13 Regardless of how
the stock value is determined, if the value is reduced with use - in this case,
if the value of reserves is reduced with extraction - then a marginal charge is
necessary even if that stock is not completely exhausted.
Royalties as the competitive equilibrium price of reserves
Closely related to the preceding analysis is an interpretation of the royalty
as the competitive equilibrium price in the market for extractable reserves.
The demand side of the market reflects the extracting firm’s response to the
parameters of its operating environment; in particular, the payment func-
tion set by the government. The supply of reserves is determined by the
government in conjunction with this payment function.
The firm’s demand for reserves, x∗ is the solution to its profit maximiza-
tion problem, given the payment function H(·, ·); i.e., x∗ is the solution to
the first-order condition (??) which we will rewrite as
H ′x = p− C ′x + C ′∆. (22)
13The inventory reduction problem illustrates the inconsistent treatment of natural re-
sources. Few would claim that an excess inventory of automobiles at the end of the model
year implies that the automobile producer should sell infra-marginal inventory at a zero
price or that automobiles are in excess supply because the shadow price of cars at the
end of the model year is zero. Prices might be reduced but there are good economic effi-
ciency reasons to believe that automobile producers are not high-grading or prematurely
curtailing sales because of excess supply at the end of the model year.
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The right-hand side of equation (??) is the demand for reserves as an input
into the production process. Viewed from a production function approach,
via the dual of the cost function, the value of the marginal product of reserves
would be zero if the left-hand side of (??) is zero.
The supply of reserves by the government, x˜ is the solution to its welfare
maximization problem; i.e., x˜ is the solution to the first-order condition
W ′x = H
′
x − ϕ′ = 0 (23)
which we rearrange as
H ′x = ϕ
′ (24)
The equilibrium condition for this market for reserves is thus
H ′x = p− C ′x + C ′∆ = ϕ′ (25)
which reveals the marginal payment H ′x as the price of reserves.
If H is restricted to be a linear function of a profit share and a royalty,
as above, then
H ′x = ρp = ϕ
′ (26)
i.e., the royalty ρp is the implicit market price (or shadow price) of reserves.
Natural resources are a stock and if the stock is scarce in an economic
sense then it will have a non-zero shadow price. The royalty is that shadow
price. Economic scarcity of a resource is not the same thing as physical
exhaustion. If the efficient royalty is zero, then natural resources are not
scarce; equivalently, they are in excess supply.
4 Uncertainty and asymmetric information
We now turn to situations in which there is uncertainty about one or more
parameters and the government and mining firm are not equally informed.
Clearly, there are many ways in which uncertainty and related informational
asymmetries can enter the extraction decision and contracting problem. We
focus on two sources: uncertainty about the quantity of reserves (R) in the
mine, and uncertainty about the value (p) of the extracted product. In the
first case we examine, the firm will know R but the government will have
only a belief characterized by a probability distribution over R. In the two
remaining cases considered, the uncertainty and informational asymmetry
16
regarding reserves will be compounded by price uncertainty, first for the
government only and then for both the firm and the government.
In all cases, the government is tasked with framing a contract in which the
payment by the firm comprises a nonlinear royalty payment ρ(·) which is a
function of the amount of ore extracted, and a nonlinear profit share payment
β(·) which is a function of the firm’s profit net of the royalty payment. We
assume that the royalty schedule is differentiable in extraction with derivative
ρ′ and the profit share is differentiable in profit with derivative β′.
The government’s objective function is the social welfare
W (x,R; ρ(·), β(·)) = H(x,R) + ϕ(R− x)
= ρ(x) + β (pipi(x,R)− ρ(x)) + ϕ(R− x). (27)
Case (a) Suppose the only uncertainty pertains to the government’s knowl-
edge of R.
Let the government’s a priori information about R be described by the
probability density function fR(R). The government must choose the pay-
ment functions ρ(·) and β(·) before the firm makes its extraction decision.
The firm’s profit-maximizing extraction level will be a function x∗ = x∗(R; ρ(·), β(·)).
The government is seeking to maximise expected welfare,
E [W (x∗(R; ρ(·), β(·)), R; ρ(·), β(·))]
=
∫
W (x∗(R; ρ(·), β(·)), R; ρ(·), β(·)) fR(R) dR (28)
The sequential timing of the problem can be characterized as follows.
• Period 1: The government sets the contract terms based on maximizing
expected welfare.
• Period 2: The firm discovers the actual amount of reserves.
• Period 3: The firm makes its extraction decision (as well as the mar-
ket participation decision) based on the payment schedule set by the
government and the amount of discovered reserves.
• Period 4: The firm reports the reserves, profits and extraction, and
pays the royalty and profit share to the extent applicable.
We can now establish the following result.
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Theorem 3 Suppose that both the government and the extracting firm can
observe or predict accurately the market price but only the firm observes
the level of reserves. If the government can charge the firm a nonlinear
royalty and a nonlinear profit share then the optimal payment schedules are
as follows:
(i) Royalty:
ρ(x) =
∫ x
x˜(R)
ϕ′
(
x˜−1(z)− z) dz. (29)
(ii) Profit share:
β(pi) =
{
pi, if px˜(R)− C(x˜(R), R− x˜(R))− ρ(x˜(R)) < pi,
px˜(R)− C(x˜(R), R− x˜(R))− ρ(x˜(R)), otherwise. (30)
where x˜(R) is the efficient extraction level consistent with reserves R, satis-
fying
p− C ′x(x˜, R)− ϕ′(R− x˜) = 0 (31)
and R is a minimum quantity of reserves below which the resource owner will
not allow any extraction.
Proof:
Throughout the proof we use notation C(x,R) instead of C(x,∆) for the cost
of extraction by the firm to simplify algebra. The firm’s optimal extraction
is characterised by the first-order condition
(p− C ′x(x∗, R)− ρ′(x∗))(1− β′(pi(x∗, R))) = 0 (32)
and the participation constraint
pi(x∗, R)− β(pi(x∗, R)) ≥ 0 (33)
This is a constrained nonlinear optimal control problem. In general, such
problems do not have closed-form solutions. We now show how the problem
can be solved for this particular case and find its closed-form solution.
Because the social welfare function is linear in the profit share and the
profit share does not create marginal incentives, whenever the firm extracts a
non-zero amount the optimal solution for the government is to set β(pi(x∗, R)) =
pi(x∗, R). The structure of the profit share is therefore:
β(pi) =
{
pi, if pi ≤ pi,
pi, if pi > pi.
(34)
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In this structure, the government sets an after-royalty profit threshold
pi. The firm will extract only if it can exceed this threshold; in effect, the
government does not allow development of the deposit otherwise.
Substituting this expression into the welfare function, we find that once
it is optimized with respect to the profit share it takes the form
W (R, x; ρ(·), β(·)) =

px− C(x,R) + ϕ(R− x),
if px− C(x,R)− ρ(x) > pi,
ϕ(R), otherwise
(35)
In other words, the government is interested in maximizing the before -
payment profit of the firm corrected for the value of the remaining reserves,
whenever the after-royalty profit exceeds a particular threshold.
In mathematical form, if x∗(R, ρ(·)) is the optimal level of extraction for
the firm responding to the royalty schedule, then the expected ex ante welfare
can be written as
E
[
W (x∗(R, ρ(·)), R; ρ(·), β(·))]
=
∫
pi(x∗(R,ρ(·)),R)≥pi
[
p x∗(R, ρ(·))− C(x∗(R, ρ(·)), R)
+ϕ(R− x∗(R, ρ(·)))
]
fR(R) dR
+
∫
pi(x∗(R,ρ(·)),R)≥pi
ϕ(R) fR(R) dR.
(36)
The government’s problem now is to set the optimal royalty schedule ρ(·)
and the threshold pi to maximize the expected welfare. This can be solved
in two steps.
Step 1
Consider the first term in E
[
W (x∗(R, ρ(·)), R; ρ(·), β(·))]:
∫
pi(x∗(R,ρ(·)),R)≥pi
[
p x∗(R, ρ(·))− C(x∗(R, ρ(·)), R)
+ϕ(R− x∗(R, ρ(·)))
]
fR(R) dR.
(37)
Note that the royalty schedule enters this expression only implicitly through
the extraction level x∗. Therefore, the royalty needs to be selected such that
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the solution to the problem of maximizing the social gain from extraction
(payment adjusted for the social value of reserves) coincides with the solution
to the firm’s problem of maximizing profit net of the royalty payment.
The social value is maximized at x˜ such that
p− C ′x(x˜, R)− ϕ′(R− x˜) = 0. (38)
We can denote the solution of this equation x˜(R), given that the social welfare
function is fixed. It follows from differentiation of equation (??) that if the
cost function is convex and the social valuation of reserves is concave, then
x˜(R) is increasing in R. The profit net of royalty is maximized at x∗ such
that
p− C ′x(x∗, R)− ρ′(x∗) = 0. (39)
The quantity of extraction with the royalty corresponds to the maximum
of social welfare if x∗ = x˜ for each level of reserves. Comparing the two
first-order conditions, we see that this occurs when
ρ′(x) = ϕ′(x˜−1(x)− x). (40)
Step 2
By construction x∗(R, ρ(·)) = x˜(R), which maximizes the sum of pre-payment
profit and the social value of reserves. We also note that by the envelope
theorem
dpi (x∗(R, ρ(·)), R)
dR
=
∂pi (x∗(R, ρ(·)), R)
∂R
> 0, (41)
because x˜(R) also maximizes the profit after royalty. As a result, the optimal
after-royalty profit is a strictly increasing function of R. Now given that
pi (x∗(R, ρ(·)), R) = pi (x˜(R), R) and it is strictly increasing in R, we can
invert pi (x˜(R), R) as a function of R. Denote by R = pi−1(pi) the solution
of pi (x˜(R), R) = pi. The ex ante social welfare can now be expressed as a
function of a single parameter pi, the threshold profit from extraction above
which the government allows extraction:
E
[
W (x∗(R, ρ(·)), R; ρ(·), β(·))]
=
∫
R≥pi−1(pi)
[p x˜(R)− C(x˜(R), R) + ϕ(R− x˜(R))] fR(R) dR
+
∫
R<pi−1(pi)
ϕ(R) fR(R) dR.
(42)
20
We note that the optimal profit threshold that solves the first-order condition
∂ E
[
W (x∗(R, ρ(·)), R; ρ(·), β(·))]
∂pi
= 0, (43)
corresponds to the minimal amount of reserves in the deposit at which the
social welfare loss from reducing reserves will become smaller than the social
gain from government revenue. Denote by R = pi−1(pi) where pi solves the
first-order condition above.
Explicitly taking the derivatives we find that
∂ E
[
W (x∗(R,ρ(·)),R;ρ(·),β(·))
]
∂pi
= −(px˜(R)− C(x˜(R), R)
+ϕ(R− x˜(R))) (∂pi(x˜(R),R)
∂R
)−1
+ϕ(R)
(
∂pi(x˜(R),R)
∂R
)−1
= 0
(44)
The solution can be expressed as
px˜(R)− C(x˜(R), R) = ϕ(R)− ϕ(R− x˜(R)) (45)
On the left-hand side of this expression there is a social gain (firm’s profit
before payments) and on the right-hand side there is a social cost (reduction
in the social value of the reserves).
The full payment schedule takes the following form:
(i) Royalty
ρ(x) =
∫ x
x˜(R)
ϕ′(x˜−1(z)− z) dz (46)
(ii) Profit share
β(pi) =

px˜(R)− C(x˜(R), R)− ρ(x˜(R)),
if pi < px˜(R)− C(x˜(R), R)− ρ(x˜(R)),
pi, otherwise.
(47)
Q.E.D.
As in the perfect certainty case, the royalty depends on the marginal
opportunity cost of depletion. The royalty amount may vary with extraction
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(or more specifically, with the level of reserves discovered). One special case is
where the marginal reduction in the value of reserves is constant (ϕ′′ = 0) over
the relevant extraction range. In this case, the royalty would be constant.
In other cases, the royalty payment will depend on cumulative extraction
and the per unit amount will vary for each level of extraction. In effect,
the government, ex post, is able to price discriminate on a per unit basis
and is able to capture the infra-marginal value. The result also provides
some support for the use of geological factors such as reserves or cumulative
extraction in practice; for example, the royalties used in the Netherlands,
Nigeria, and Kazakhstan.
The profit share is completely one-sided in favor of the state. After re-
serves are determined, the government knows everything needed to extract
the entire surplus from the producer and can do so efficiently with a simple
fixed payment or service contract model.
We also see that the government may impose a minimum reserve require-
ment where reserves below the level specified will not be sufficient for the
recovery of the fixed cost of devoting the reserves to extraction.
Case (b) Suppose now that there is also uncertainty about the value of the
extracted mineral when the government is determining the payment regime
but that subsequently the price is known to the firm when it makes its ex-
traction decision. We assume that this price uncertainty is independent from
uncertainty about reserves.
The sequential timing of decisions is similar to that described for the
previous case where only reserves are uncertain for the government:
• Period 1: The government sets the contract terms based on maximizing
expected welfare.
• Period 2: The firm discovers the actual quantity of reserves and the
market price of the resource.
• Period 3: The firm makes the extraction decision (as well as the mar-
ket participation decision) based on the payment schedule, price and
discovered reserves.
• Period 4: The firm reports the price and discovered reserves to the
government and pays the royalty and profit share to the government
based on the contract terms.
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In this case, the government is assumed to have independent probability
distributions over R and p, with densities fR and fp. Provided that the
profit-maximizing extraction level is a function x = x(p,R; ρ(·), β(·)), the
government will want to choose payment schedules ρ(·) and β(·) to maximise
expected welfare:
E
[
W (x(p,R; ρ(·), β(·)), R; ρ(·), β(·))]
=
∫
W (x(p,R; ρ(·), β(·)), R; ρ(·), β(·)) fp(p)fR(R) dp dR. (48)
We can establish the following result.
Theorem 4 Suppose that the government must set the payment schedule
while uncertain about both the stock of reserves and the mineral price whereas
the extracting firm can observe or predict accurately these values when making
its extraction decision. If the government can charge the firm a nonlinear
royalty and a nonlinear profit share then the optimal payment schedules are
as follows:
(i) Royalty
ρ(x) =
∫
p
∫ x
x˜(R)
ϕ′(x˜−1(p, z)− z)fp(p) dp dz. (49)
(ii) Profit share
β(pi) =
{
pi(p), if pi < pi(p),
pi, otherwise.
(50)
where x˜(p,R) solves
p− C ′x(x˜, R− x˜)− ϕ′(R− x˜) = 0. (51)
and
pi(p) = px˜(p,R(p))− C(x˜(p,R(p)), R(p))− ρ(x˜(p,R(p))
for
px˜(p,R(p))− C(x˜(p,R(p)), R(p)) = ϕ(R(p))− ϕ(R(p)− x˜(p,R(p))).
Proof:
The solution of the firm’s optimal decision problem is characterized by the
first-order condition along with the participation constraint:
(p− C ′x(x∗, R)− ρ′(x∗))(1− β′(pi(p, x∗, R))) = 0, (52)
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and
pi(p, x∗, R)− β(pi(p, x∗, R)) ≥ 0. (53)
To solve the problem we use the standard calculus of variations. First note
that, because social welfare is linear in the profit share and the profit share
does not create distortions, whenever the firm extracts a non-zero amount,
the optimal solution for the government is to set β(pi) = pi. Thus, the
structure of the profit share is the following:
β(pi) =
{
pi(p), if pi ≤ pi(p),
pi, if pi > pi(p).
(54)
This expression resembles the structure when there is no price uncertainty,
but the thresholds are now allowed to depend on the price.
Substituting this expression into the welfare function, we obtain a welfare
function optimized with respect to the profit share:
W (p, x,R; ρ(·), β(·)) = px− C(x,R) + ϕ(R− x), (55)
if px−C(x,R)− ρ(x) > pi and the welfare is ϕ(R) otherwise (where pi is the
profit threshold to be determined later).
In mathematical form, if x∗(p,R, ρ(·)) is the optimal solution of the firm
responding to the royalty schedule, then the expected ex ante welfare can be
written
E[W (p, x∗(p,R, ρ(·)), R; ρ(·), β(·))]
=
∫
pi(p,x∗(p,R,ρ(·)),R)>pi
[
p x∗(p,R, ρ(·))− C(x∗(p,R, ρ(·)), R)
+ϕ(R− x∗(p,R, ρ(·)))
]
fp(p)fR(R) dp dR
+
∫
pi(p,x∗(p,R,ρ(·)),R)≤pi
ϕ(R) fp(p)fR(R) dp dR.
(56)
The problem of the government now is to set the optimal royalty schedule
ρ(·) and the threshold pi to maximize the welfare:
∫
pi(p,x∗(R,ρ(·)),R)≥pi
[
p x∗(p,R, ρ(·))− C(x∗(p,R, ρ(·)), R)
+ϕ(R− x∗(p,R, ρ(·)))
]
fp(p)fR(R) dR.
(57)
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We note that the royalty schedule enters this expression only implicitly
through the extraction level x∗. Therefore, we can first find the expected
welfare-maximizing exraction level and then determine the royalty schedule
compatible with such extraction. As a result, using the envelope theorem we
note that
0 =
∫
pi(p,x∗(p,R,ρ(·)),R)≥pi
[
p− C ′x(x∗(p,R, ρ(·)), R)
−ϕ′(R− x∗(p,R, ρ(·)))
]
fp(p)fR(R) dR
=
∫
pi(p,x∗(p,R,ρ(·)),R)≥pi
[p− C ′x(x∗(p,R, ρ(·)), R)] fp(p)fR(R) dR dp
− ∫
pi(p,x∗(p,R,ρ(·)),R)≥pi
(∫
p
ϕ′(R− x∗(p,R, ρ(·)))fp(p) dp
)
fR(R) dR
(58)
The social value of profit adjusted for the loss of reserves is maximized
at x˜ such that
p− C ′x(x˜, R)− ϕ′(R− x˜) = 0. (59)
Suppose that x˜(p,R) is the solution to this equation and x˜−1(p, x) is a solu-
tion of equation x˜(p,R) = x for a given price p. Combining this with (??)
we have the optimal royalty rate given by
ρ′(x) =
∫
p
ϕ′(x˜−1(p, x)− x) fp(p) dp. (60)
To find the threshold profit pi determining the structure of the profit share
we take equation
px˜(p,R)− C(x˜(p,R), R) = ϕ(R)− ϕ(R− x˜(p,R)) (61)
which balances profit from extraction (before payments) against the social
cost of the extraction, and solve this equation for R for each p and obtain
the function R(p). We obtain the profit corresponding to the extraction
threshold as a function of price,
pi(p) = px˜(p,R(p))− C(x˜(p,R(p)), R(p))− ρ(x˜(p,R(p)). (62)
The payment schedules thus take the following form:
(i) Royalty
ρ(x) =
∫
p
∫ x
x˜(R)
ϕ′(x˜−1(p, z)− z)fp(p) dp dz. (63)
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(ii) Profit share
β(pi) =
{
pi(p), if pi ≤ pi(p),
pi, otherwise.
(64)
Q.E.D.
The optimal royalty has the same general form as when the government
is uncertain about reserves only. Once again, the government is able to
discriminate in the sense that all infra-marginal opportunity cost is recovered.
The recovery of full opportunity cost relative to the certainty case is not
complete, however, because the government never knows the price and the
infra-marginal values now depend on the government’s price distribution.
Profit sharing is again fully in favor of the government because it can
force the firm to pay the full amount of reported ex post profit.
Case (c) Suppose that now, in addition to the government’s uncertainty
about the level of reserves and the price of the extracted mineral, the firm
also is exposed to the price uncertainty and must make its extraction decision
before the output price is revealed. We demonstrate that in this case the
optimal payment schedule does not generally decompose into a profit share
and the royalty: the royalty will be taken on the basis of the excessive profit
of the firm that is computed using the distribution of market prices. The
timing of the new problem will be the following.
• Period 1: The government sets the contract terms based on maximizing
expected welfare.
• Period 2: The firm discovers the actual reserve amount.
• Period 3: The firm makes the extraction decision (as well as the market
participation decision) based on the contract with the government and
the discovered reserve but without knowing the price.
• Period 4: Price uncertainty is realized and the firm pays the royalty
and profit share to the government based on the contract terms.
To identify clearly the source of uncertainty, we will use Ep[·] to denote
the expectation with respect to price uncertainty and ERp[·] the expectation
with respect to uncertainty about both price and reserves. We assume, to
avoid further complication, that both the government and the firm hold the
same probability distribution over prices.
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The expected profit of the firm after payment of the royalty and profit
share is
Ep[pi
∗(p,R, x)] = Ep [px− C(R, x)− ρ(x)− β(pi(p,R, x))] . (65)
The first-order condition for the firm and ex ante participation constraint for
the firm can be written as
Ep [(p− C ′x(x∗, R)− ρ′(x∗)) (1− β′(pi(p,R, x∗)))] = 0 (66)
and
pi(p¯, R, x∗)− Ep [β (pi(p,R, x∗))] ≥ 0, (67)
where p¯ = Ep[p]. If we introduce notation β¯
′ = Ep[β
′(pi(p,R, x∗))] then we
can rewrite the first order condition as:
(p¯− C ′x(x∗, R)− ρ′(x∗))
(
1− β¯′
)
= covp (p, β
′ (pi(p,R, x∗))) (68)
We can compare this with the first-order condition when there was no price
uncertainty. If the price were fixed at its average level p¯ and the marginal
profit share were fixed at its average level, the left-hand side of (??) would
equal zero. The effect of the price uncertainty is to cause the marginal profit
after royalty to be proportional to the covariance between the price and the
marginal profit share, which we expect to be positive.
We note next that the threshold structure for the profit share, established
in the cases where there is no price uncertainty for the firm, will no longer
apply. For each extraction level, there will be a range of prices for which the
profit of the firm will be below any given threshold pi and the firm will not
participate.
With this information, the expected social welfare can be written:
ERp [W (x,R; ρ(·), β(·))] = ERp [ρ(x) + β(pi(p,R, x)) + ϕ(R− x)] . (69)
The social welfare is strictly increasing in the profit share (all other things
being equal). As a result the welfare maximizing profit share will make the
participation constraint binding, i.e.
Ep [β(pi(p,R, x
∗))] = pi(p¯, R, x∗) (70)
whenever the firm chooses to extract from the deposit. Equation (??) only
contains the extraction level x∗ and the reserves R. As a result, for each pair
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of payment schedules ρ(·) and β(·) there will exist the reserve level R below
which the firm decides not to participate. Thus the welfare at the optimum
can be rewritten as
ERp [W (x
∗, R; ρ(·), β(·))]
= ER [(pipi(p¯, R, x
∗) + ϕ(R− x∗))1{R > R}]
+E [ϕ(R)1{R ≤ R}] ,
(71)
where R is the minimal level of reserves below which the firm does not par-
ticipate. The social welfare will be maximized at x˜(R) such that
p¯− C ′x(x˜, R)− ϕ′(R− x˜) = 0. (72)
Then x˜(R) will solve the first-order condition of the firm (??) if and only
if
ρ′(x∗) +
covp (p, β
′ (pi(p,R, x∗)))
1− β¯′ = ϕ
′(R− x∗). (73)
Recall that expected social welfare (??) depends on the reserve threshold R
below which the firm does not participate. Provided that this threshold is
determined by the royalty and the profit share, it can be treated as the choice
variable of the government. Taking the derivative of the expected social
welfare with respect to R, we find the minimal extraction level R = x˜−1(x)
such that
pipi(p¯, x˜
−1(x), x) = ϕ(x˜−1(x))− ϕ (x˜−1(x)− x) , (74)
where x˜(·) is the welfare-maximizing extraction level from (??).
The optimal royalty therefore can be expressed as
ρ(x) =
∫ x
x
ϕ′(x˜−1(z)− z) dz −
∫ x
x
covp (p, β
′ (pi(p, x˜−1(z), z)))
1− β¯′ dz. (75)
The efficient royalty is now dependent on the marginal value of depletion
adjusted for the covariance between price and the profit sharing rate.
To characterize the optimal profit share, we note that it should prohibit
participation of firms that would extract less than x (given that it is socially
optimal not to extract if reserves are too low). The profit share should also
satisfy the participation constraint for any (optimal) extraction level above
x. Thus:
Ep
[
β(px− C(x, x˜−1(x))− ρ(x))] = p¯ x− C(x, x˜−1(x))− ρ(x), (76)
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for all x ≥ x, and
Ep
[
β(px− C(x, x˜−1(x))− ρ(x))] = p¯ x− C(x, x˜−1(x))− ρ(x), (77)
for all x < x.
5 Summary and Discussion
The results derived above reflect the perspective that natural resource stocks,
like stocks of reproducible capital and labor, will accrue a non-zero shadow
price if demand is sufficient to eliminate any excess supply in an economic
sense. Physical exhaustion is not necessary for reserves to have a non-zero
shadow price. As our analysis shows, this shadow price is the efficient royalty.
The analysis presented here for natural resource pricing is relevant in
other contexts; the supposed inefficiency of sharecropping being an obvious
example. The private sector institution of charging a fixed proportion of
output for a land lease in agriculture has been criticized as inefficient since
the time of Marshall and a profit-sharing scheme claimed to be more effi-
cient. Of course, a profit-sharing scheme is more efficient if the value of the
marginal product of land is zero. If agricultural use decreases the fertility of
land, however, and the residual land value falls as land is more intensively
used, sharecropping will be an efficient solution. Sharecropping is only one
possible application of the basic reasoning. An analogous argument provides
a rationalization for compensating agents (such as actors or athletes) on a
percentage of gross or proportion of sales basis.
In this paper, we do not argue that ”economic rents,” however defined,
are zero or that a profit sharing scheme (or risk sharing scheme) is inefficient.
Rather, a distinction needs to be drawn between economic rent and oppor-
tunity cost, both in total and at the margin. Some of the natural resource
literature has placed emphasis on the nature of the rents that accrue because
natural assets are gifts from nature (Garnaut and Clunies Ross 1983, IMF
2012). This emphasis has led to the view that certain pricing schemes, such
as royalties, are inefficient. Our analysis demonstrates that such a claim is
not valid in general. From an economic perspective, the positive value of an
asset is not affected by how it was produced, whether by nature or by indus-
try. Resource owners (the government, in most countries) must determine
when, how much, in what order, and in what use to employ their natural
resource stocks. These decisions are not costless even in a frictionless world
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where reserves can be extracted at different points in time and the land or
ocean that contains those reserves has alternative uses. Equally important,
economic exhaustion and physical exhaustion do not coincide by necessity.
Economic exhaustion may occur within the time frame of one contract, leav-
ing reserves for future extraction or land for alternative uses.
The approach adopted here takes account of the opportunity cost of own-
ership and alternative use (through time and space) which implicitly has
been assumed to be zero in previous analyses, leaving extraction decisions to
producers who have no economic interest in the residual value of the reserves,
the land or the water after extraction is completed. Thus, asset values (liq-
uidation values) at the end of extraction may be zero for the producer both
in total and at the margin.
The fact that it might be counter to the producer’s interest to extract
reserves during any defined contract period does not mean that those reserves
will not be extracted in the future, as illustrated in Table 2. Alternatively,
the opportunity cost of resource development for natural resource owners
might be too high. Some landowners might prefer to use the land for other
uses - for strictly monetary uses such as farming, environmental uses such as
land set-asides, or the economic welfare benefits of maintaining the property.
If the marginal opportunity cost is not zero, then a price should be charged
(or imputed, in the case where the extraction profile is controlled) and the re-
source owner should accrue that price as the return from ownership. If, how-
ever, the opportunity cost is zero, then resources are in excess risk-adjusted
supply forever and the resource owner should then receive zero, at least at
the margin and perhaps in total. Reserves left in the ground have no social
value forever and it is not clear that even reserves extracted have any value
at the margin.
Two policy implications stem from the results. First, an efficient natural
resource contract may contain at least two payment types: a royalty to cap-
ture the opportunity cost and an income charge to capture rent. We do not
opine on whether an income charge beyond the generally applicable income
tax is desirable.14 Second, the government might have an ownership inter-
est in natural resources and there is at best a tenuous connection between
14A profit share combined with an efficient income tax will increase the risks borne by
the resource owner. Whether the expected return is sufficient to offset the cost of risk
bearing needs to be addressed. This may be particularly important in countries where
income is relatively low and the economy poorly diversified relative to the shareholders of
large multinational firms interested in entering into extraction contracts.
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efficient input pricing and taxes. For example, the United States federal gov-
ernment does not enter into resource contracts when reserves are privately
held. This simple example highlights the fact that ownership, and in turn
the preferences as well as the costs of resource owners, may affect the value
of the marginal payments as well as the signal created by charging a positive
royalty. Governments also impose generally applicable income taxes. One
purpose served by these taxes is to collect rent from all sectors. Thus, there
may be no prima facie case for a special rent charge on natural resources
when social opportunity cost is taken into account.
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Table 1. Selective Outline of Policy in Some Petroleum-Producing Countries 
 
Country Royalty Profits Tax Excess Profits 
Charge or Charge in 
Addition to Profits 
Tax 
Algeria Variable rate 
5.5% - 23% based on 
quantity produced 
and zone 
Petroleum income 
tax variable rate 30% 
- 70% based on 
production 
30% if profits are not 
reinvested.  
(Royalties deductible) 
Equity Participation 
Australia (Offshore) 0% 29% 40% (Petroleum 
Resource Rent Tax) 
Azerbaijan 26% non-PSA 
(0% PSA) 
Negotiated rates 
between 25% - 32% 
Production sharing 
Canada (Alberta) Sliding scale based 
on price and quantity 
14.36% Provincial 
19.5% Federal 
None 
China Variable rate based 
on production  0% - 
12.5% 
25% Excess Profits Tax 
based on production.  
Rates vary based on 
price. 
Ghana 3% - 12.5% based on 
agreement 
50% on upstream 
activities 
Minimum carried 
interest of 10% 
A type of Resource 
Rent Tax, rates 
depend on contract. 
Indonesia 0% 25% Production Sharing.  
Rates vary by 
contract.  There are 
cost limitations. 
Iraq 0% (Service 
Contract) 
35% Service Contract with 
remuneration based 
on internal rates of 
return 
Kazakhstan 2% - 6% based on 
production 
30% Rate varies from 0 to 
60% based on ratio of 
accrued revenue to 
accrued expenses 
(Not applicable for 
production sharing) 
Production Sharing 
rates  based on 
internal rates of 
return and pay backs 
The Netherlands Variable Rate (0% - 
7%) based on 
production 
25% 50% ring-fenced 
measure of profits 
Nigeria 0% - 12% based on 
depth of offshore 
deposit 
30% 85% on exports and 
65.5% on domestic 
sales based on 
measured profits less 
Country Royalty Profits Tax Excess Profits 
Charge or Charge in 
Addition to Profits 
Tax 
incentives 
Norway 0 (abolished 2006) 28% 50% “Special Tax on 
extraction, processing 
and pipeline 
transport” 
United States 
(Offshore) 
1/6 (Revenue less 
short term lifting 
cost) 
35% maximum rate None 
United Kingdom 0 (abolished 2003) 23% maximum Rate 32% ring-fenced cash 
flow 
Venezuela 30% 50% Equity Participation 
and Production 
Sharing.  Production 
sharing has variable 
rate based on internal 
rate of return. 
 
 
Table 2: Examples of Mines that Have Been Closed but Reopened at a Later Date 
 
Name and Location of Mine Opened Closed Reopened 
Affinity Mine1 
West Virginia, US 
1951 1985 2011  
Continental Pit2 
Montana, US 
1980 2000 2003  
Copperstone Mine3 
Arizona, US 
1987 1993 
 
2011 
Hemerdon (or Drakelands) Mine4 
Devon, England 
1917 1944 2014 
Hycroft Mine5 
Nevada, US 
1987 1998 2008  
Kingman Mine6 
Arizona, US 
1880s 1972 2004 
Népoui-Kopéto Mining Centre7 
New Caledonia 
1970 1983 1994 
Pueblo Viejo Mine8 
Dominican Republic 
1975 1991 
 
2013 
Shafter Silver Project9 
Texas, US 
1883 1942 2012 
 
White Pine10 
Michigan, US 
1865 1997 2014 
 
 
                                                          
1 Coal. http://www.register-herald.com/news/local_news/affinity-mine-reopens-with-fanfare/article_c1d19d12-758f-
5594-8628-41823e38a94b.html (accessed 31 August 2015) 
2 Copper. http://www.deseretnews.com/article/595076167/Mine-reopening-lifts-battered-Butte.html?pg=all 
(accessed 31 August 2015) 
3 Gold. http://www.kerrmines.com/projects/copperstone-mine  (accessed 31 August 2015)  
4 Tungsten.  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hemerdon_Mine (accessed 31 August 2015) 
5 Gold and silver. http://www.alliednevada.com/properties/hycroft-mine/ (accessed 31 August 2015) 
6 Turquoise. http://www.silversunalbuquerque.com/turquoise-mines/Kingman (accessed 31 August 2015) 
7 Nickel. http://www.eramet.com/sites/default/files/eramet_nickel_division_mining_centres.pdf and 
http://www.sln.nc/nepoui-kopeto (accessed 31 August 2015) 
8 Gold. http://www.mining-technology.com/projects/pueblo-viejo-gold-mine/ (accessed 31 August 2015) 
9 Silver. http://www.aurcana.com/operations/overview/ (accessed 31 August 2015)  
10 Copper. http://www.highlandcopper.com/s/white_pine_north.asp (accessed 31 August 2015) 
